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Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise 
This is the fourth in a series of National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) conference volumes on pensions in  the United  States. The 
first was Financial Aspects of the  United States Pension System, the 
second, Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice, and the third, Issues 
in Pension Economics. 
This volume begins with a series of four papers on retirement saving 
of  individuals and the saving which results from corporate funding of 
their  pension  plans.  The  first paper discusses individual  retirement 
accounts (IRAs). The second considers reasons why more individual 
retirement saving is not used to purchase annuities. The third examines 
the reasons for recent  reductions  in  saving through private pension 
plans.  The fourth deals with poverty  among retirees, whose  saving 
preparation for retirement may have been inadequate.  Following are 
two papers that address particular aspects of pension plans themselves: 
The first considers the relative merits of defined benefit versus defined 
contribution plans from the perspective  of  the employee wishing to 
avoid retirement income uncertainty. The second is an empirical in- 
vestigation of the relationship between pension plan provisions and job 
turnover. 
Individual and Corporate Retirement Saving Behavior 
Individual Saving for Retirement: IRAs and Annuities 
While increasingly large numbers of employees are covered by pen- 
sion plans, many are not. In recognition of this fact, individual retire- 
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ment accounts (IRAs) were established  as part of the Employee Re- 
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to encourage employees without 
private plans to save for retirement. The Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of  1981, emphasizing the need  to increase national  saving as well as 
the need to prepare for retirement, extended the availability of IRAs 
to all employees. The principal incentive of lRAs for saving is that 
federal taxes on contributions and accrued interest are paid only when 
funds are withdrawn from the accounts. In particular, if  the rate of 
return on saving is Y  (1 -  t),  where t is the marginal tax rate, the return 
on IRAs is r. There is  a penalty,  however, for withdrawal  of funds 
before age 59’/2,  presumably  to discourage using  these tax-deferred 
saving vehicles for nonretirement purposes. Any employee can now 
contribute $2000 to an IRA each year; an employee and a nonworking 
spouse can contribute $2250. Recent tax proposals have suggested sub- 
stantial increases in these limits. 
“The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit 
Changes” are analyzed by David A. Wise and Steven F.  Venti. They 
find that IRAs are no more likely to be used by those without than by 
those with private pension plans, after controlling for income and other 
individual attributes. Thus, they do not, in general, serve as  a substitute 
for private pension plans. Nonetheless, many persons with or without 
private plans who contribute to IRAs may save more than they oth- 
erwise would. An annual contribution of $2000 to an IRA represents 
much more in  future retirement income than  most private pension 
plans. The extent to which IRAs represent actual increases in individual 
saving, versus a substitute for other forms of saving, is not addressed 
in  this paper,  but  this will  be addressed in  subsequent work by the 
authors. 
About 72  percent of all contributors have incomes between $10,000 
and $40,000, although only about 20 percent of persons in this income 
interval have an IRA. Only about 5 percent of employees with incomes 
less than $10,000 have IRAs, while approximately 60 percent of those 
with incomes greater than $100,000 do. 
Although they are not typically substitutes for private pensions and 
are uncommon among low- income employees, IRA limit increases like 
those currently under consideration would lead to substantial increases 
in  tax-deferred  saving according  to the estimates in  the paper.  For 
example, if  both employee and spousal  limits were raised  to $2500, 
their estimates indicate that total IRA contributions would increase by 
about 30 percent. 
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Model estimates based on Canadian Registered Retirement Savings 
Plan  (RRSP) data, the counterpart of  IRA and Keogh  plans  in  the 
United States, are very similar to the U.S. estimates, even though the 
Canadian plan has been in effect since 1957 and the contribution limits 
are very different from those in the United States. Thus, similar pa- 
rameter estimates in  the two countries tend  to  lend  support to the 
behavioral implications of the model specifications. 
If saving for retirement is a major motivation for saving, it is puzzling 
that more of it does not take the form of the accumulation of annuities. 
Annuities have the advantage of insuring the individual against a very 
long life, thus tending to reduce the cost of financing a particular stan- 
dard of  living in  retirement. They do have  some disadvantages, of 
course. First, they leave no bequeathable wealth. Second, in the real 
world, annuities are not indexed for inflation, and, therefore, they are 
less adequate in providing long life insurance than indexed annuities 
would  be. Third, the private voluntary annuity market suffers from 
adverse selection. Those who purchase them tend to live longer than 
the general population, so there is less risk pooling than with universal 
participation. 
Friedman and Warshawsky provide an interesting examination of 
why the market for individual annuities is so thin. In the first section 
of their paper, they provide the first careful computation of the “load 
factor” charged by insurance companies on annuity policies. That is, 
they compare the cost of the annuity with the expected present value 
of the benefits evaluated at two market interest rates. When they do 
this calculation using general population mortality assumptions, they 
find that the load factor ranges from 20 percent to  55 percent, depending 
on the issuing company and the interest rate assumption. When they 
take account of the better mortality experience of annuity purchasers 
(the adverse selection problem, from the point of view of the insurance 
company), the load factor ranges from 6 percent to 40 percent. The 
average load factor is in the 25  percent range. This is not above the 
load factor for other types of insurance policies. 
Friedman and Warshawsky develop an extended version of the life- 
cycle saving and portfolio behavior model which incorporates a bequest 
motive, uncertain lifetimes, and the presence of Social Security. They 
find, for reasonable parameterizations of their model, that the load 
factor would  have to be much larger than they calculate it to be in 
order to account for observed behavior in the absence of a bequest 
motive. However, they find that a modest weight on bequests in lifetime 
utility can lead to model behavior consistent with observations. Their 
paper, thus, indicates that it is the structure of preferences at least as 
much as the load factor which is responsible for the predominance of 
saving in forms other than annuities. 4  Zvi BodieIJohn B. ShovenIDavid A. Wise 
Corporate Saving for Retirement 
Bernheim and Shoven’s paper, “Pension Funding and Saving,” first 
documents a  series of  facts regarding the funding of  corporate and 
government pensions as a source of loanable funds saving in the econ- 
omy. They find that despite the fact that 70 percent of pension plans 
are defined contribution, 70 percent of assets and participants are cov- 
ered by defined benefit plans. Clearly, defined benefit plans are much 
larger on average. They also note that the net contributions  (net of 
payouts) to pensions are a major and growing part of personal saving 
in  the economy.  In the  1950s, pension  accumulations  amounted  to 
roughly a quarter of personal saving; in the second half of the 1970s, 
pensions accounted for more than half of personal saving; and in the 
first four years  of  the  1980s, pensions accounted  for 92  percent  of 
personal saving. 
The  main  point  of  the  Bernheim-Shoven  paper,  however,  is  that 
pension  saving may  be  the answer to why  personal  saving has not 
increased in  spite of the several saving and investment incentives en- 
acted by the Reagan administration. Defined benefit pensions, by their 
very nature, have negative contribution elasticities with respect to the 
rate of return on financial securities. That is, the higher the earnings 
on the pension fund assets, the lower are new contributions.  To  see 
this, one simply needs to look at a defined benefit pension plan from 
the perspective of the firm. The firm has pension obligations based on 
its employees’ salaries and years of service. In order to compute the 
adequacy of its funding of those promises, the firm typically projects 
the future obligations and then discounts them to obtain their present 
value using an assumed interest rate (which amounts to the assumed 
rate of return on assets funding the plan). It then compares this derived 
expected  present  value of  liabilities to the pension  fund’s assets to 
compute the unfunded liability and to determine the appropriate level 
of contributions. Clearly, this is the classic example of target saving, 
and a higher rate of return permits meeting the target with lower con- 
tribution levels. 
Bernheim and Shoven estimate the magnitude of the negative elas- 
ticity both econometrically and with a simple analytic model. The two 
approaches lead to consistent conclusions. Namely, they find that the 
negative elasticity is large and significant for net pension contributions. 
A  1 percentage point  increase in real interest  rates, for instance, is 
predicted  to decrease net  pension  contributions  in  the  long run  by 
between 20 and 30 percent. Such sensitivity is consistent with the recent 
weakness in  pension funding and in personal saving in general in the 
United States. 5  Introduction 
Inadequacies in Saving of Current Retirees 
In their paper “Poverty among the Elderly: Where Are the Holes in 
the Safety Net?” Michael J. Boskin and John B. Shoven supplement 
previous research, which has concentrated on the elderly as a whole 
or  on representative elderly, with an in-depth examination of those who 
end up poor in retirement. First, they find that a nontrivial fraction of 
the elderly in the Retirement History Survey (those where the house- 
hold head  was born  between  1905  and  1911) either remained poor, 
became poor, or had a much lower standard of living in retirement than 
earlier in their life. This occurred  despite the enormous general im- 
provement of the economic status of  the elderly, part of  which was 
made possible by very large increases in real Social Security benefits. 
Examination of  the characteristics  of  those  who fell through  the 
safety net reveals that women, especially widows, were the most likely 
candidates for economic difficulty in  this cohort in this stage of their 
lives. 
A variety of other variables seem to be related to the probability of 
low incomes and/or low replacement rates. For example, those who 
retired relatively early tended to be more likely to be poor and/or to 
have low replacement rates. This partly reflects particular institutional 
features surrounding Social Security and its double indexing for a brief 
period, but it also reflects in part factors influencing retirement in the 
first place. 
A variety of other intriguing findings are mentioned, including the 
sharp differences  in  realizations  of  retirement  income expectations 
among those who were poor and/or had low replacement rates relative 
to those who did well.  Perhaps much  of  this  seems  self-evident in 
retrospect, but it is important to attempt to get behind these numbers 
to the reasons why these events occurred. Undoubtedly, many of them 
had case-specific causes. The results of  this study suggest a need for 
further research on the structure and nature of the survivorship and 
annuity features of pensions; the coverage and marital status provisions 
of Social Security; as well as a more detailed study of the relationships 
between actual retirement income outcomes and expectations. 
Corporate Pension Financing and Employee Pension Effects 
Corporate Funding and Investment Policy 
In “Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What 
Are the Real Trade-offs?” Zvi Bodie, Alan J. Marcus, and Robert C. 
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defined contribution plans from the point  of  view of  the employee. 
Their emphasis is on the risk aspects of the two types of plans. 
Defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans 
have significantly different characteristics with respect to the risks faced 
by  employers and employees, the sensitivity of benefits to inflation, 
the flexibility of funding, and the importance of governmental super- 
vision. Bodie, Marcus, and Merton examine some of the main trade- 
offs involved in the choice between DB and DC plans.  Their most 
general conclusion is that neither type of  plan can be said to wholly 
dominate the other from the perspective of  employee welfare. 
The major advantage of  DB plans is their potential for providing a 
stable replacement  rate  of  final  income to workers.  The pegging of 
benefits in  DB  plans to final average wage would appear to provide 
employees with a type of income maintenance insurance not available 
in  DC plans. This conclusion is, however, not robust. If  wage paths 
are unpredictable at the start of a career, then individuals may view it 
as very risky to have their retirement benefits depend so heavily on 
final salary. Indeed, employees might prefer a retirement benefit tied 
to inflation-adjusted career average earnings to eliminate excessive de- 
pendence on the realized wage in the final years of employment. This 
time-averaging feature is achieved by a DC plan because benefits will 
depend on the contribution in  each year of service, rather than on a 
final wage formula. Although inflation-adjusted career average DB plans 
would achieve the same goal, in practice these plans are quite rare. In 
fact, the only major DB plan that pays a benefit computed in such a 
fashion is the Social Security system. 
It  is often  asserted  that  a  DC  plan  subjects  an employee to  the 
investment risk associated with the performance of the fund’s assets, 
whereas in a DB plan such risk is absent. However, it is always feasible 
for a DC plan to select an investment strategy which has low risk even 
in real terms. There are, however, no strong a priori reasons to believe 
that most individuals would choose to invest accumulated DC funds 
in the lowest risk asset. DC plans typically offer employees sufficient 
flexibility to select a risk-return strategy suited to their individual pref- 
erences and circumstances. In contrast, DB plans force individuals to 
accumulate the pension portion of their retirement savings in the form 
of nominal deferred life annuities and thus limit their risk-return choice. 
DB plans have accrual patterns  which are inherently backloaded. 
DC plans can be backloaded too by choosing a contribution rate that 
rises with a worker’s age and tenure. Therefore, the salient inherent 
differences in accrual patterns between the two plan designs is that DB 
backloading is stochastic in the sense that real benefit accruals depend 
upon the rate of wage inflation. This seems to be an avoidable source 7  Introduction 
of uncertainty which both parties (employer and employee) might ben- 
efit by shedding. 
It is commonly assumed that considerations of portability favor DC 
plans. The typical justification is that the worker in a DB  plan who 
leaves his job for reasons beyond his control forfeits future indexation 
of benefits already accrued. It is further asserted that there are implicit 
contracts between employees and firms which require larger total com- 
pensation (wage plus pension accrual) for more highly tenured workers. 
Hence, termination of employment causes a forfeiture of the ability to 
work for advantageous total compensation rates in particular, index- 
ation of total pension accruals). Under this line of reasoning, DC plans 
are more portable. Clearly this advantage of DC plans is most apparent 
during periods of inflation. 
The authors conclude that neither type of plan can be said to wholly 
dominate the other from the point of view of the employee. Whether 
one is better than the other depends both on employee preferences and 
on uncertainty about inflation and interest rates. 
Individual Benefits and Incentive Effects 
To find out what the incentive effects of pension plans are, Edward 
P.  Lazear and Robert L. Moore in “Pensions and Turnover”  analyze 
the relationship between pension plan versions and worker turnover. 
There are two primary innovations in this empirical work: First, they 
use data from six different firms that include information on the precise 
provisions of the firms’ pension plans. There is considerable variation 
in the individual plans’ provisions. Second, instead of considering the 
relationship between accrued pension  wealth and the probability of 
leaving the firm at a particular age, the authors consider the option 
value of retirement now versus working for an additional year.  The 
option of working an additional year allows the employee the chance 
to choose the best of subsequent retirement years. For example, an 
employee who enters the plan with a ten-year vesting period has no 
accrued pension wealth during the first ten years. Nonetheless, working 
during the third year, for example, instead of retiring at the end of the 
second year, brings the worker nearer to the year in which he will be 
vested. The option of working until the vesting year is not foreclosed 
if the person remains with the firm. The authors argue that at any age 
the option value of  continuing work is the appropriate variable to in- 
clude in a regression framework. 
The authors’ initial results show that a  10  percent increase in  the 
option value reduces the probability of turnover for older workers by 
1 percent. They predict turnover rates to be twice as high for workers 
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in turnover is predicted to be 4 percent instead of 9 percent for workers 
without pension plans. The paper also investigates empirically the dif- 
ference in the implications for turnover of the two measures of pension 
value, that is, the more commonly used accrued pension wealth versus 
the pension option value as defined by the authors. 